PLEASE ACT NOW: Sign-on to Statement Protecting Rwandan Refugees!
On 31 December 2011, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and several states hosting Rwandan refugees are considering invoking the “cessation clause” of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. This is a very unusual and dangerous move that could cause revocation of the refugee status of tens of thousands of people who fled ethnic and political persecution in Rwanda, stripping them of basic rights and exposing them to forcible repatriation and possible persecution. Cessation is premature and should be stopped.
But you can do something about it! Send the FAHAMU Refugee Programme an email indicating that you endorse the statement below. We will carry your views to the Executive Committee of UNHCR and representatives of its Member States at their annual meeting in Geneva from 3rd – 5th October.
Here’s the text:
We, the undersigned, oppose invocation of the “cessation clause” of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees with respect to Rwanda. Thousands of persons fled Rwanda and are currently seeking protection abroad. These are not people escaping retribution from the 1994 genocide; they are those who have been fleeing Rwanda since that event because of the instability, ethnic strife, arbitrary judicial procedures, indiscriminate retaliation, political violence, intolerance of dissent, impunity, and lack of accountability that has followed.
Cessation is a drastic measure that would strip refugees of their legal rights and expose them to forcible repatriation and the risk of further persecution. The Cessation Clause should only be invoked with extreme caution when there has been, according to the Guidelines of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 1) a fundamental and profound change in country conditions such that they no longer have a well-founded fear of persecution, 2) the change is demonstrably enduring and not merely transitory, and, 3) the change enables refugees to enjoy the protection of the government.
Rwanda has made much progress since the genocide but it has not done so through reliable democratic and peaceful means. It remains a fragile, volatile, authoritarian regime with little tolerance for dissent, freedom of speech, or independent human rights reporting. Social and political fissures remain unresolved and the Rwandan government maintains an overtly hostile attitude towards its citizens who have fled. Positive changes need time to consolidate and genuine national reconciliation remains untested. Moreover, since 2009, more Rwandans have been fleeing, not just Hutu, but large numbers of genocide survivors who were never refugees before, as well as officials of the Rwandan government and officers from its army. Now is not the time to revoke protection from Rwandan refugees!
Endorse Now! Send your name, job title, and organizational affiliation as you wish it to appear, along with your country of residence, to Barbara@fahamu.org. If you can endorse on behalf of your organization, church, business, union, or other civic group, let us know—that will be even more powerful! (Otherwise we will just list your affiliation “for identification only.”)
Wednesday, August 31, 2011
Protesting Kagame Only One Part of the Equation
I have been contacted in the past few weeks to support Rwandans living in the Disapora to protest President Paul Kagame's upcoming visit to France. I do support such actions in principle, because I think it is important that Rwandans and others interested in peace and security in the country (and region) engage in such protest. It is important to continue to alert members of the international community of Kagame's human rights excesses and continued repression of various political freedoms.
Of late, I am finding the tone and pitch of the language used by members of the Disapora worrying. In some cases, opinion is centred on 'getting rid of Kagame' without much regard to what a post- RPF Rwanda might look like. Certainly, Kagame will have to face justice for crimes committed before and during his tenure, but this day is not around the corner. If anything, it's a long shot to think that Kagame will face international justice, and consequently not a meaningful strategy for change. By 'change', I think these critics mean opening up the political space. Indeed, this is an important issue, but is not in my opinion the most pressing one at this moment. The conditions on the ground simply do not exist for a serious accounting of history, opposition politics, and political freedoms are not ripe.
Instead, I think activists and advocates should be focusing on calling out the RPF on its relations with the peasantry. The 'peasantry' (some 90% of Rwandans) are left out of the gains brought by the country's impressive economic growth. Finding meaningful ways to narrow this gap seems to me to be the most pressing issue facing Rwanda at the moment.
Of late, I am finding the tone and pitch of the language used by members of the Disapora worrying. In some cases, opinion is centred on 'getting rid of Kagame' without much regard to what a post- RPF Rwanda might look like. Certainly, Kagame will have to face justice for crimes committed before and during his tenure, but this day is not around the corner. If anything, it's a long shot to think that Kagame will face international justice, and consequently not a meaningful strategy for change. By 'change', I think these critics mean opening up the political space. Indeed, this is an important issue, but is not in my opinion the most pressing one at this moment. The conditions on the ground simply do not exist for a serious accounting of history, opposition politics, and political freedoms are not ripe.
Instead, I think activists and advocates should be focusing on calling out the RPF on its relations with the peasantry. The 'peasantry' (some 90% of Rwandans) are left out of the gains brought by the country's impressive economic growth. Finding meaningful ways to narrow this gap seems to me to be the most pressing issue facing Rwanda at the moment.
Saturday, August 20, 2011
My Reaction to the Reaction to 'Silent Sabotage'
A few weeks ago, I was invited by an editor at Nairobi's The East African newspaper to publish a short opinion piece based on my recently published article in the journal African Affairs, entitled 'Whispering Truth to Power: The Everyday Resistance of Peasant Rwandans to Post-Genocide Reconciliation'. I readily accepted for two reasons. First, I consider The East African the premier newspaper in the region, and was thrilled to have been asked to contribute to a newspaper I respect and consult on a regular basis. Second, as an academic, I can't reasonably turn down any opportunity to share my research findings. It is simply not in my DNA! You can find the original East African post here.
As I've said before, my work in Rwanda is directed at one broad goal, namely, no more violence by any party, ever. Full stop. Of course this is a lofty ideal, and one that is not easily operationalised. So, I have focused my research on understanding everyday life since the genocide to demonstrate that the 'new' Rwanda is largely being built on the backs of peasants who are not, by and large, sharing in the yearly average of eight percent average economic growth. Socio-economic inequality is a pressing issue, and one that spills into the political sphere that the ruling RPF so desperately seeks to control. This is the position that I write from. I know that academic articles are rarely consulted, and less rarely read, so well-placed opinion pieces are part and parcel of my academic work. Indeed, I moved to the US to work at Hampshire College in large part because of its commitment to social justice issues and its support of faculty who engage in activist-inspired research.
I also write opinion pieces to keep peasant perspectives on the radar screen of folks working in the country -- tourists, students, journalists, diplomats, etc. -- because Kigali is so impressive with its clean streets, low crime, internet cafes, high rises and other trappings of Western success. There is a story behind the carefully crafted and calibrated message of the 'new' Rwanda as one where the institutional structures that created the genocide have been undone (they have not), that Rwandans are reconciled (some are, many are not), and that the country is peaceful and secure (nationally secure, yes, locally peaceful not so much).
It is because there is some truth to the arguments I posit in my opinion pieces that I am subject to the often-vitriolic commentary of Rwandan journalists and other writers (including some working as advisors and/or speech writers in the Office of the Rwandan President). It is rare that my actual arguments are engaged, although this reaction from Jean-Paul Kimonyo on Paul Kagame's presidential website is the first sign of actual engagement of my ideas. Usually, the reaction is more insult than dialogue, like this example from Rwanda's The New Times.
I give these two examples to throw out this idea. If my analysis is as far-fetched as my critics and opponents contend, then why do they spend so much time trying to discredit my writing?
I think the answer lies in a legitimacy crisis. There is an alternate story about Rwanda behind the impressive accomplishments that are put on display, largely for a Western audience. Life for non-elite actors, nearly 90% of the population, is tough. It is a life of fear, harassment and grinding poverty while elites posture for proximity to political power. There is a growing disconnect between peasant realities and government rhetoric about those realities. And therein lies the lack of legitimacy to govern that RPF enjoys in some rural areas in Rwanda.
The acts of everyday resistance that my research identifies does not point to riot, revolt or rebellion. The local dynamics are simply not such to allow for such popular organisations. Instead, the minute and subtle actions that some peasants engage in vis-a-vis the demands of local officials to comply with central government policies reveal one of the most vexing insecurities faced by local and central government officials in postgenocide Rwanda. As individuals who exercise their authority through fear, government officials expect a certain measure of deference and compliance to their demands.
In much the same way, those writers charged with challenging my work also seem to expect my compliance to their spurious arguments. Sadly for them, these reactions are having the opposite effect -- the more they react, the more my work is read.
As I've said before, my work in Rwanda is directed at one broad goal, namely, no more violence by any party, ever. Full stop. Of course this is a lofty ideal, and one that is not easily operationalised. So, I have focused my research on understanding everyday life since the genocide to demonstrate that the 'new' Rwanda is largely being built on the backs of peasants who are not, by and large, sharing in the yearly average of eight percent average economic growth. Socio-economic inequality is a pressing issue, and one that spills into the political sphere that the ruling RPF so desperately seeks to control. This is the position that I write from. I know that academic articles are rarely consulted, and less rarely read, so well-placed opinion pieces are part and parcel of my academic work. Indeed, I moved to the US to work at Hampshire College in large part because of its commitment to social justice issues and its support of faculty who engage in activist-inspired research.
I also write opinion pieces to keep peasant perspectives on the radar screen of folks working in the country -- tourists, students, journalists, diplomats, etc. -- because Kigali is so impressive with its clean streets, low crime, internet cafes, high rises and other trappings of Western success. There is a story behind the carefully crafted and calibrated message of the 'new' Rwanda as one where the institutional structures that created the genocide have been undone (they have not), that Rwandans are reconciled (some are, many are not), and that the country is peaceful and secure (nationally secure, yes, locally peaceful not so much).
It is because there is some truth to the arguments I posit in my opinion pieces that I am subject to the often-vitriolic commentary of Rwandan journalists and other writers (including some working as advisors and/or speech writers in the Office of the Rwandan President). It is rare that my actual arguments are engaged, although this reaction from Jean-Paul Kimonyo on Paul Kagame's presidential website is the first sign of actual engagement of my ideas. Usually, the reaction is more insult than dialogue, like this example from Rwanda's The New Times.
I give these two examples to throw out this idea. If my analysis is as far-fetched as my critics and opponents contend, then why do they spend so much time trying to discredit my writing?
I think the answer lies in a legitimacy crisis. There is an alternate story about Rwanda behind the impressive accomplishments that are put on display, largely for a Western audience. Life for non-elite actors, nearly 90% of the population, is tough. It is a life of fear, harassment and grinding poverty while elites posture for proximity to political power. There is a growing disconnect between peasant realities and government rhetoric about those realities. And therein lies the lack of legitimacy to govern that RPF enjoys in some rural areas in Rwanda.
The acts of everyday resistance that my research identifies does not point to riot, revolt or rebellion. The local dynamics are simply not such to allow for such popular organisations. Instead, the minute and subtle actions that some peasants engage in vis-a-vis the demands of local officials to comply with central government policies reveal one of the most vexing insecurities faced by local and central government officials in postgenocide Rwanda. As individuals who exercise their authority through fear, government officials expect a certain measure of deference and compliance to their demands.
In much the same way, those writers charged with challenging my work also seem to expect my compliance to their spurious arguments. Sadly for them, these reactions are having the opposite effect -- the more they react, the more my work is read.
Tuesday, July 26, 2011
IRIBA CENTER in Rwanda: A Media Archive to Remember History
I'm writing to ask you to support the creation of the Iriba Center in Rwanda, a media archive. Hopefully, you are familiar with Anne Aghion's remarkable films on gacaca; the most recent being "My Neighbor, My Killer". I find her style of film-making, which allows Rwandans to speak without any voice-over narrative, renders the complexity of gacaca and reconciliation in Rwanda with great sensitivity. I use her films a great deal in teaching and am amazed that they speak to students who know little or nothing of Rwanda, to Rwandans, and to scholars specializing in the region.
Her final products required literally hundreds of hours of filming in Rwanda over 10 years time. The vast majority of footage she shot did not make it into the films and has been residing under her bed in her Paris apartment. She has been looking for a suitable archive for this footage and decided to create the Iriba Center in Kigali, modeled after the Bophana Center in Cambodia, so that scholars and Rwandans can have access not only to this film footage but also other films and documentation.
She and her collaborators are raising money through a Kickstarter campaign: http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1021275587/iriba-center-in-rwanda-a-media-archive-to-remember
Kickstarter is a fundraising website that raises money to launch projects. The goal is to raise $40,000 by August 21. As of this morning, the campaign has almost reached 50%.
I just made my pledge today, and I ask you to consider making a pledge in any amount to support this important project. Even 1$ will make an important difference!
Her final products required literally hundreds of hours of filming in Rwanda over 10 years time. The vast majority of footage she shot did not make it into the films and has been residing under her bed in her Paris apartment. She has been looking for a suitable archive for this footage and decided to create the Iriba Center in Kigali, modeled after the Bophana Center in Cambodia, so that scholars and Rwandans can have access not only to this film footage but also other films and documentation.
She and her collaborators are raising money through a Kickstarter campaign: http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1021275587/iriba-center-in-rwanda-a-media-archive-to-remember
Kickstarter is a fundraising website that raises money to launch projects. The goal is to raise $40,000 by August 21. As of this morning, the campaign has almost reached 50%.
I just made my pledge today, and I ask you to consider making a pledge in any amount to support this important project. Even 1$ will make an important difference!
Silent Sabotage: How the Rwandan Peasantry is Defying 'Reconciliation'
Why would peasant Rwandans resist the government’s post-genocide reconciliation programme, particularly when so many people — donors, journalists, policy-makers and civil society representatives alike — see Rwanda as a peaceful, stable, development-oriented country in the midst of the violent turmoil of the Great Lakes Region?
From the perspective of the rural poor, the answer is that many of them consider the programme unjust and illegitimate as it works against their interests as peasants. This is an important point to consider given that peasants were the main actors in Rwanda’s 1994 genocide as both perpetrators and survivors. Incorporating peasants who lived through the violence of the genocide into the Rwandan policy as participating members is necessary to avoid future mass atrocity.
Rwanda’s programme of national unity and reconciliation is the backbone of the Rwandan government’s reconstruction strategy following the genocide in which civilian Hutu killed at least 500,000 Tutsi – though most estimates hover around a million. Introduced in 1999, the programme aims to create “one Rwanda for all Rwandans,” meaning the government actively seeks to undo Tutsi and Hutu ethnic labels in favour of an inclusive Rwandan one.
The government claims that the programme is successfully promoting ethnic unity as the basis of lasting reconciliation between the country’s main ethnic groups. From the perspective of Rwandan peasants I interviewed, the programme forcibly produces the appearance — but not the reality — of national unity and reconciliation.
Thus obedience to the dictates of the programme is frequently tactical, rather than sincere, as peasants employ various strategies to avoid participation. A look at the resistance of peasants to the programme opens up for analysis the extent to which the government’s rhetoric about delivering peace, justice, and reconciliation to Rwandans is reflected in the lived reality of the populace.
The mandatory activities imposed on peasant Rwandans in the name of national unity and reconciliation (such as the umuganda or community work days, the ingando citizenship re-education camps and the gacaca justice trials) prevent them from tending their fields and engaging in other life-sustaining activities.
That Rwanda’s rural poor do not support the programme of national unity and reconciliation may seem counter-intuitive to those who know of Rwanda’s admirable recovery from the violence of the 1994 genocide, particularly given the country’s impressive economic and institutional gains. Peasant Rwandans resist largely because the programme does not allow for frank or open discussion of how ethnic categories shaped the violence of the genocide, nor is there any official recognition of lived experiences that differ from the official version, in which only Tutsi were victims and only Hutu killed.
Nor does the government allow for public acknowledgment of the existence or experience of Tutsi and Twa perpetrators; Hutu and Twa rescuers; Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa resisters; or Hutu and Twa survivors. Tutsi are rightfully and correctly survivors of genocide, as they were targeted by virtue of their ethnicity, but all Rwandans are survivors of conflict, jostled and shaped by traumatic events over which they had little or no control.
Because the programme of national unity and reconciliation does not acknowledge the multitude of lived through experiences of Rwandans of all ethnicities during the genocide, peasant Rwandans I consulted understood well the risks of speaking out against the programme and so found subtle, indirect, and non-confrontational ways to avoid or subvert the demands of the programme.
A common tactic employed by peasant Rwandans is “staying on the sidelines,” and is embodied in an array of avoidance tactics to keep out of trouble with the local authorities. of all ethnicities shared this sentiment with me. For example, Aurelia, a 39-year-old Hutu widow, says that she actively tries to avoid her local official: “The best strategy is to avoid the authorities. When you see them, they make demands for reconciliation. [My official] knows that I lost all of my people [family members] during the events.”
Another common form of peasant resistance is withdrawn muteness. These are purposeful and strategic acts of silence that peasant Rwandans employ to defy the expectations of the programme in ways that either protect their limited resources or assure their dignity in their interactions with local officials. For example, Trésor, a 16-year-old Tutsi boy, described the purpose of withdrawn muteness as a tactic that sabotages government efforts to promote reconciliation: “Remaining silent is very rewarding because it angers local officials. They ask if we are stupid. They ask why we are so difficult. That is the point. The officials make us get reconciled but I just want to be left alone. Being silent is a good way to avoid the difficulties of life since the genocide. Silence helps us do that in ways that make sense to us, not to local officials.”
The truth is that peasant Rwandans feel that the programme makes their daily struggle to provide for survival more complicated. Rather than blindly or willingly accept state-led directives to reconcile with each another, peasant Rwandans recognise that the policy is yet another form of social control that they strategically avoid so that they can get on with more pressing matters of rebuilding their lives and livelihoods. Domestic and international actors that care about sustainable peace in Rwanda and in the countries of the Great Lakes more broadly need to consider the behaviour and attitudes of rural folk, lest they once again take up arms against neighbours, colleagues, and friends.
From the perspective of the rural poor, the answer is that many of them consider the programme unjust and illegitimate as it works against their interests as peasants. This is an important point to consider given that peasants were the main actors in Rwanda’s 1994 genocide as both perpetrators and survivors. Incorporating peasants who lived through the violence of the genocide into the Rwandan policy as participating members is necessary to avoid future mass atrocity.
Rwanda’s programme of national unity and reconciliation is the backbone of the Rwandan government’s reconstruction strategy following the genocide in which civilian Hutu killed at least 500,000 Tutsi – though most estimates hover around a million. Introduced in 1999, the programme aims to create “one Rwanda for all Rwandans,” meaning the government actively seeks to undo Tutsi and Hutu ethnic labels in favour of an inclusive Rwandan one.
The government claims that the programme is successfully promoting ethnic unity as the basis of lasting reconciliation between the country’s main ethnic groups. From the perspective of Rwandan peasants I interviewed, the programme forcibly produces the appearance — but not the reality — of national unity and reconciliation.
Thus obedience to the dictates of the programme is frequently tactical, rather than sincere, as peasants employ various strategies to avoid participation. A look at the resistance of peasants to the programme opens up for analysis the extent to which the government’s rhetoric about delivering peace, justice, and reconciliation to Rwandans is reflected in the lived reality of the populace.
The mandatory activities imposed on peasant Rwandans in the name of national unity and reconciliation (such as the umuganda or community work days, the ingando citizenship re-education camps and the gacaca justice trials) prevent them from tending their fields and engaging in other life-sustaining activities.
That Rwanda’s rural poor do not support the programme of national unity and reconciliation may seem counter-intuitive to those who know of Rwanda’s admirable recovery from the violence of the 1994 genocide, particularly given the country’s impressive economic and institutional gains. Peasant Rwandans resist largely because the programme does not allow for frank or open discussion of how ethnic categories shaped the violence of the genocide, nor is there any official recognition of lived experiences that differ from the official version, in which only Tutsi were victims and only Hutu killed.
Nor does the government allow for public acknowledgment of the existence or experience of Tutsi and Twa perpetrators; Hutu and Twa rescuers; Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa resisters; or Hutu and Twa survivors. Tutsi are rightfully and correctly survivors of genocide, as they were targeted by virtue of their ethnicity, but all Rwandans are survivors of conflict, jostled and shaped by traumatic events over which they had little or no control.
Because the programme of national unity and reconciliation does not acknowledge the multitude of lived through experiences of Rwandans of all ethnicities during the genocide, peasant Rwandans I consulted understood well the risks of speaking out against the programme and so found subtle, indirect, and non-confrontational ways to avoid or subvert the demands of the programme.
A common tactic employed by peasant Rwandans is “staying on the sidelines,” and is embodied in an array of avoidance tactics to keep out of trouble with the local authorities. of all ethnicities shared this sentiment with me. For example, Aurelia, a 39-year-old Hutu widow, says that she actively tries to avoid her local official: “The best strategy is to avoid the authorities. When you see them, they make demands for reconciliation. [My official] knows that I lost all of my people [family members] during the events.”
Another common form of peasant resistance is withdrawn muteness. These are purposeful and strategic acts of silence that peasant Rwandans employ to defy the expectations of the programme in ways that either protect their limited resources or assure their dignity in their interactions with local officials. For example, Trésor, a 16-year-old Tutsi boy, described the purpose of withdrawn muteness as a tactic that sabotages government efforts to promote reconciliation: “Remaining silent is very rewarding because it angers local officials. They ask if we are stupid. They ask why we are so difficult. That is the point. The officials make us get reconciled but I just want to be left alone. Being silent is a good way to avoid the difficulties of life since the genocide. Silence helps us do that in ways that make sense to us, not to local officials.”
The truth is that peasant Rwandans feel that the programme makes their daily struggle to provide for survival more complicated. Rather than blindly or willingly accept state-led directives to reconcile with each another, peasant Rwandans recognise that the policy is yet another form of social control that they strategically avoid so that they can get on with more pressing matters of rebuilding their lives and livelihoods. Domestic and international actors that care about sustainable peace in Rwanda and in the countries of the Great Lakes more broadly need to consider the behaviour and attitudes of rural folk, lest they once again take up arms against neighbours, colleagues, and friends.
Wednesday, June 29, 2011
Action: Amnesty International Campaign on freedom of speech in Rwanda
Amnesty International Campaign on freedom of speech in Rwanda, now beginning: Freedom of expression has been unduly restricted for many years. August 2010 presidential elections, which President Kagame won with 93 per cent of the vote, were marked by a clampdown on freedom of expression. The Rwandan government has expressed a commitment to review laws which criminalize criticism, but recent trials of journalists and opposition politicians suggest that Rwanda’s clampdown on critics shows no sign of abating. Ditto the detention of Victoire Ingabire for freedom of expression "crimes".
We have postcards you can mail to President Kagame. Let me know if you would like any, and i've have them mailed to you. This is an important campaign. Or, you can tweet the same to @Paul Kagame and his Foreign Minister, @LMushikiwabo.
For postcards, please contact Ken Harrow at harrow@msu.edu.
You can also "like" Amnesty's Central Africa page on Facebook to keep abreast of this campaign and others in the region.
We have postcards you can mail to President Kagame. Let me know if you would like any, and i've have them mailed to you. This is an important campaign. Or, you can tweet the same to @Paul Kagame and his Foreign Minister, @LMushikiwabo.
For postcards, please contact Ken Harrow at harrow@msu.edu.
You can also "like" Amnesty's Central Africa page on Facebook to keep abreast of this campaign and others in the region.
Tuesday, April 5, 2011
On Genocide Anniversary, Rwanda Needs Political Reform
This Thursday, April 7, 2011 marks the seventeenth anniversary of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, where more than 800,000 lives were lost when Hutu-led, state-based militia goaded neighbours to kill neighbouring Tutsis. The anniversary is a time to pause and reflect on the progress the country has made since the genocide, and to ask if mass political violence could again happen in this East African country.
By most accounts, Rwanda is a nation rehabilitated. The institutions of the state have been rebuilt and infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and airports have been restored and in some areas, upgraded. Rwanda is a leader on the African continent in terms of service delivery in education and health. The Rwandan government and a coterie of friends that include Hollywood celebrities, professional athletes, western philanthropists, diplomats and donors project this message of rehabilitation and dismiss any critical accounts to the contrary as absurd. The Rwandan government and these “friends of Rwanda” also dismiss the notion that Rwanda’s post-genocide reconstruction and reconciliation policies could be setting the stage for another round of political violence.
Most outsiders fail to recognize the lack of political freedoms and economic inequalities that confront Rwandans who are not members of the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The vast majority of Rwandans—Hutu and Tutsi alike—who survived the genocide remain politically marginalized, extremely poor, and in many cases, traumatized by what they have lived through. Daily life for many is characterized by lack of food, clean water, and affordable and proximate health services, while the elite enjoy European coffee houses, wireless internet hotspots, new housing and shopping malls, accessible health care and other services. The gap between urban elites and the rural citizenry – some 90% of Rwandans live in rural areas – has never been larger.
It is this growing socio-economic inequity between the ruling elite and average Rwandans that makes another round of political violence possible. In order to maintain the peace, international actors active in Rwanda, and the broader Great Lakes Region of Africa, must push the RPF towards a real democratic opening. They must press President Paul Kagame to create space for national dialogue, meaning an open and safe space where all Rwandans can meet to discuss the genocide, and to strategize ways to move forward from the hurt of the past. This is particularly important after the recent release of a UN report detailing allegations of systematic killings of Rwandan Hutu by the RPF in eastern Congo before, during and after the 1994 genocide.
There are two things that the “friends of Rwanda” can do to encourage a more open and peaceful political culture until Paul Kagame is expected to step down in 2017.
The first is to question the current government's ability to manage Rwanda's people and natural resources. The US State Department estimates that by 2020, Rwanda will be home to 13 million people—up from the 11 million in 2011—making it the most densely populated country in Africa with 225 people per square mile. Over 90 percent of Rwandans are subsistence farmers and will be the first to suffer when the central government is unable to respond to their daily needs. The government requires rural farmers to grow coffee and tea for export instead of subsistence crops. A new land policy has decreased peasant holdings to less than a half-acre making it difficult for farmers to feed their families. The RPF does not allow peasant farmers to voice concerns about the agricultural policies and the inequitable distribution of land among government loyalists.
An underfed and disaffected local population is hardly a good starting point toward building a sustainable peace and democracy. The friends of Rwanda, led by Rwanda’s international donors, will need to pressure the RPF in order to ensure that agricultural and land policies are aimed to developing long-term peace and security, not quick gains for party loyalists.
Second, Kagame will need encouragement to engage the diverse political views of the Rwandan diaspora. Kagame must be made to acknowledge that criticisms exist alongside the positive involvement of the diaspora in Rwanda's economic development. As incentive, he can take note of the diaspora’s contribution of nearly US$130 million to Rwanda's economy in 2010 (second only to tourist receipts). To date, Western donors have failed to seriously push Kagame to engage dissident opinion within the diaspora. For Kagame, sincere dissidents who criticize RPF policy are lumped with political extremists such as the FDLR (Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda) rebel group, making it easy to justify their exclusion from the Rwandan political sphere. A sincere distinction should be made, and Friends of Rwanda and donors can encourage government engagement with all sectors of the diaspora as part of the broader strategy of political openness and dialogue.
Indeed, encouraging openness among Rwandans at home and in the disapora is a necessary ingredient to Kagame’s continued reign. The RPF is now under increased scrutiny from its core constituency—educated, urban Tutsi. Many of these individuals, especially Anglophone Tutsi who had returned after the 1994 genocide, have lost faith in the post-genocide reconstruction and development vision of a government that they now consider corrupt and nepotistic. It was significant, and perhaps most worrying for Kagame, that this group of vocal critics includes several senior military officers—among them former army chief Gen. Kayumba Nyamwasa and Théogene Rudasingwa, a former major and ambassador to the US, who have both joined hands and formed the Rwanda National Congress (RNC) in December 2010. Analysts believe that Gen. Nyamwasa commands considerable sympathy among the military rank-and-file, making the threat of a coup a possibility for the first time since 1994. Indeed, Gen. Nyamwasa has intimated in recent press appearances that he is prepared to unseat Kagame by force if necessary.
It is critical on this seventeenth anniversary of the genocide that friends of Rwanda begin to push their governments and other international actors to revisit their support for Kagame in order to avoid future violence.
By most accounts, Rwanda is a nation rehabilitated. The institutions of the state have been rebuilt and infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and airports have been restored and in some areas, upgraded. Rwanda is a leader on the African continent in terms of service delivery in education and health. The Rwandan government and a coterie of friends that include Hollywood celebrities, professional athletes, western philanthropists, diplomats and donors project this message of rehabilitation and dismiss any critical accounts to the contrary as absurd. The Rwandan government and these “friends of Rwanda” also dismiss the notion that Rwanda’s post-genocide reconstruction and reconciliation policies could be setting the stage for another round of political violence.
Most outsiders fail to recognize the lack of political freedoms and economic inequalities that confront Rwandans who are not members of the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The vast majority of Rwandans—Hutu and Tutsi alike—who survived the genocide remain politically marginalized, extremely poor, and in many cases, traumatized by what they have lived through. Daily life for many is characterized by lack of food, clean water, and affordable and proximate health services, while the elite enjoy European coffee houses, wireless internet hotspots, new housing and shopping malls, accessible health care and other services. The gap between urban elites and the rural citizenry – some 90% of Rwandans live in rural areas – has never been larger.
It is this growing socio-economic inequity between the ruling elite and average Rwandans that makes another round of political violence possible. In order to maintain the peace, international actors active in Rwanda, and the broader Great Lakes Region of Africa, must push the RPF towards a real democratic opening. They must press President Paul Kagame to create space for national dialogue, meaning an open and safe space where all Rwandans can meet to discuss the genocide, and to strategize ways to move forward from the hurt of the past. This is particularly important after the recent release of a UN report detailing allegations of systematic killings of Rwandan Hutu by the RPF in eastern Congo before, during and after the 1994 genocide.
There are two things that the “friends of Rwanda” can do to encourage a more open and peaceful political culture until Paul Kagame is expected to step down in 2017.
The first is to question the current government's ability to manage Rwanda's people and natural resources. The US State Department estimates that by 2020, Rwanda will be home to 13 million people—up from the 11 million in 2011—making it the most densely populated country in Africa with 225 people per square mile. Over 90 percent of Rwandans are subsistence farmers and will be the first to suffer when the central government is unable to respond to their daily needs. The government requires rural farmers to grow coffee and tea for export instead of subsistence crops. A new land policy has decreased peasant holdings to less than a half-acre making it difficult for farmers to feed their families. The RPF does not allow peasant farmers to voice concerns about the agricultural policies and the inequitable distribution of land among government loyalists.
An underfed and disaffected local population is hardly a good starting point toward building a sustainable peace and democracy. The friends of Rwanda, led by Rwanda’s international donors, will need to pressure the RPF in order to ensure that agricultural and land policies are aimed to developing long-term peace and security, not quick gains for party loyalists.
Second, Kagame will need encouragement to engage the diverse political views of the Rwandan diaspora. Kagame must be made to acknowledge that criticisms exist alongside the positive involvement of the diaspora in Rwanda's economic development. As incentive, he can take note of the diaspora’s contribution of nearly US$130 million to Rwanda's economy in 2010 (second only to tourist receipts). To date, Western donors have failed to seriously push Kagame to engage dissident opinion within the diaspora. For Kagame, sincere dissidents who criticize RPF policy are lumped with political extremists such as the FDLR (Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda) rebel group, making it easy to justify their exclusion from the Rwandan political sphere. A sincere distinction should be made, and Friends of Rwanda and donors can encourage government engagement with all sectors of the diaspora as part of the broader strategy of political openness and dialogue.
Indeed, encouraging openness among Rwandans at home and in the disapora is a necessary ingredient to Kagame’s continued reign. The RPF is now under increased scrutiny from its core constituency—educated, urban Tutsi. Many of these individuals, especially Anglophone Tutsi who had returned after the 1994 genocide, have lost faith in the post-genocide reconstruction and development vision of a government that they now consider corrupt and nepotistic. It was significant, and perhaps most worrying for Kagame, that this group of vocal critics includes several senior military officers—among them former army chief Gen. Kayumba Nyamwasa and Théogene Rudasingwa, a former major and ambassador to the US, who have both joined hands and formed the Rwanda National Congress (RNC) in December 2010. Analysts believe that Gen. Nyamwasa commands considerable sympathy among the military rank-and-file, making the threat of a coup a possibility for the first time since 1994. Indeed, Gen. Nyamwasa has intimated in recent press appearances that he is prepared to unseat Kagame by force if necessary.
It is critical on this seventeenth anniversary of the genocide that friends of Rwanda begin to push their governments and other international actors to revisit their support for Kagame in order to avoid future violence.
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