Since I posted last, I have received several not-so-friendly reactions about how my understanding and explanation of Rwandan history is "flawed", "self-interested" or "a crime against the humanity of survivors". Such statements are made anonymously, which weakens their impact. I mean, at least identify yourself so we can have a proper dialogue and debate! I would love to be wrong about the worrying trends I see on the ground in Rwanda. If I am correct, then people will die and this is the last thing I want....
At the same time, I have received many words of thanks and encouragement. For, "those of us that were there know what we saw". Because this is not a "Hutu" or a "Tutsi" issue, but rather one of individuals trying to have their experiences of genocide recognised so that they too can talk about them openly and without fear of repercussion, I am providing this excerpt from my own research on what I think happened during the genocide. For those of you that wrote to say I am a denier, I am not. I do not buy into recent debates that the RPF organised the genocide. I could be considered a revisionist as my account does differ from the official and accepted version of what the RPF says happened.
"Between April and July 1994, genocide engulfed Rwanda. Across the hills and in the valleys, in churches and homes, on narrow footpaths and in banana groves, in stadiums and schools, killers slaughtered at least 500,000 people, mainly ethnic Tutsi (Des Forges, 1999: 15). The genocide was carefully planned by a small élite group of powerful ethnic Hutu extremists who refused to share power under the conditions of the Arusha Accord. Through an orchestrated strategy to liquidate Tutsi and any politically moderate Hutu perceived as opposed to the Habyarimana regime, the extremists had one goal in mind: to maintain their monopoly on state power.
Unknown assailants shot down he plane carrying the Rwandan president as it approached Kigali airport; soon after the killing started in the capital during the night of 6-7 April 1994. Militias – the Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi – led the killing with the help of the Presidential Guard, the army, and local government officials (African Rights, 1994; Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1995). Outside Kigali, ordinary Hutu men committed acts of genocide, often under the direction of militia or government soldiers, under the threat of loss of their own life or that of their loved ones if unwilling to participate (Straus, 2006: 122-152). Genocidal violence occurred at different times in different regions of the country (André and Platteau, 1998; Des Forges, 1999: 303-591; Guichaoua, 2005, 258-290; Straus, 2006: 53-60). In some instances, local political and business élites colluded to enlist ordinary Rwandans to genocide (Longman, 1995; Wagner, 1998). Social ties and local power dynamics often compelled ordinary Hutu to kill; others resisted participation. Some stood by while a few rescued, instead of killing intended victims (Fujii, 2008; Straus, 2006: 65-94). Not all Hutu participated, and not all participated to the same degree. Some killed enthusiastically; others killed a few (Prunier, 1995: 242-250). Some Tutsi men joined in the killing as a means to save themselves and their families (fieldnotes, 2006).
The RPF also committed widespread reprisal killings – between 10,000 and 50,000 Hutu died – while countless others of all ethnicities died as the RPF gave greater priority to military victory than to protecting Tutsi civilians (Des Forges, 1999: 16). An estimated 10,000 ethnic Twa were killed during the genocide (IRIN, 6 June 2001). At least 250,000 women – mostly Tutsi but some Hutu – were raped (HRW, 2004: 7). Some men also admit to being raped (fieldnotes, 2006). Countless others, men and women, young and old, healthy and infirm, were tortured or maimed.
The 1994 genocide is much more than a series of facts and figures about who killed, who died and who survived. Irrespective of ethnic category, ordinary Rwandans were caught up in the maelstrom. There are countless stories of survival, of friends and family who took extraordinary risks to protect Tutsi (African Rights, 2003f, 2003h; Rusesabagina, 2006; Umutesi, 2004). There are stories of Tutsi who put their own lives on the line to protect Hutu family and friends from the coercion and intimidation tactics that the killing squads used to goad ordinary Hutu into killing (African Rights, 2003b, 2003c; fieldnotes, 2006). Notorious killers protected Tutsi they knew personally, ushering them safely through roadblocks, warning them of the whereabouts of marauding groups, and even hiding them at their homes. Some individuals killed during the day, only to shelter Tutsi friends and relatives at night (fieldnotes, 2006). Many Tutsi survived because of the aid and succour of a Hutu family member, friend, colleague, neighbour, or stranger (Jefremovas, 1995). There are stories about Twa and Hutu who were killed in the genocide because of their “typical Tutsi features” (fieldnotes, 2006).
Instrumentalising the Genocide
Despite the complexity of the genocide, the RPF-led government presents it as a clear-cut affair: Hutu killed Tutsi because of ethnic divisions that were introduced during the colonial period (1890-1962) and hardened to the point of individual action during the postcolonial period (1962-1994). Ethnicity is a fiction created by colonial divide-and-rule policies. Ultimate blame for the 1994 genocide therefore lies with Rwanda’s colonial powers, who instituted policies that made the Hutu population hate Tutsi. Divisive politics grounded in decades of bad governance resulted in deep-rooted ethnic hatred of all Tutsi by all Hutu, causing the 1994 genocide (NURC, 2004a; Office of the President, 1999a). This simplistic interpretation of events forms the backbone of the programme of national unity and reconciliation, which is grounded in the need “to eradicate the devastating consequences of the policies of [ethnic] discrimination and exclusion” so that “the scourge of genocide never again happens in Rwanda” (NURC, 2004a: 19-20).
Straus (2006) identifies different motivations for different forms of killing in interviews with génocidaires. He writes, “motivation and participation were clearly heterogeneous” with different forms of killing with different motivations occurring simultaneously (Straus, 2006: 95). The forms of killing were: 1) killing, torture, rape, and mutilation perpetrated against civilians – mainly Tutsi but also politically moderate Hutu – by militias, Forces armées rwandaises (FAR) soldiers and willing ordinary people; 2) killing, torture, rape, and mutilation perpetrated against Tutsi by ordinary Hutu, typically under duress from local leaders; 3) intended killing of soldiers and collateral killing of civilians (Tutsi, Hutu and Twa) in the course of the conflict between the RPF and the FAR; 4) killings carried out by the RPF against civilians (Tutsi, Hutu and Twa); and 5) murder motivated by theft and looting as well as the settling of scores between ordinary people (Straus, 2006: 113-118; 135-140; 163-169). Ordinary Rwandans understand that all of these different types of killings took place during the genocide and they use the phrases “les événements de 1994” (the events of 1994) and “en 1994” (in 1994) to describe “everything that happened in 1994, not just the genocide” (fieldnotes, 2006).
Straus’s findings on individual motivations to kill are particularly instructive as they reveal the intentional simplification of the government in grounding its approach to post-genocide justice in the presumed ethnic hatred of all Hutu for all Tutsi. His research shows that “preexisting ethnic animosity, widespread prejudice, deeply held ideological beliefs, blind obedience, deprivation, or even greed” did not motivate individual Hutu to kill individual Tutsi (Straus, 2006: 96). Instead, Straus finds that “Rwandans’ motivations [for killing] were considerably more ordinary and routine than the extraordinary crimes they helped commit” (Straus, 2006: 96. See also, Fujii, 2008; Hatzfeld, 2005b; Longman 1995; Wagner 1998). Among ordinary Hutu, participation was driven by intra-ethnic pressure from others, usually more socially powerful Hutu, security fears in the context of civil war and genocide as well as opportunity for looting and score settling. Straus concludes that these factors “were salient in a context of national state orders to attack Tutsis [sic], war, dense local institutions, and close-knit settlements” (Straus, 2006: 97). The available evidence simply does not support Rwandan government claims that ethnic enmity drove the participation of ordinary Rwandans in the 1994 genocide. Officially, this ethnic enmity is called “genocide ideology”; much of the work of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission is concerned with identifying and eliminating the genocidal thoughts of ordinary Hutu to prepare them to engage in state-led reconciliation activities. In practice, as will be further analysed in the next chapter, accusing an individual of harbouring “genocide ideology” is a tool used against any individual or group that steps outside the accepted boundaries of government policy. Approaching post-genocide justice on the presumption of a criminal (adult male Hutu) population is a useful mechanism that the RPF strategically deploys to control political opponents, deflect criticism of its actions during the genocide and justify its continued military presence in Eastern Congo (Jordaan, 2007; Usborne and Penketh, 2008).
The programme of national unity and reconciliation legitimates the moral right of the RPF to rule post-genocide Rwanda. The programme is supported by a historical narrative about Rwanda’s past in an effort to shape the collective memory of the genocide, a narrative which eliminates the real social and economic inequality faced by most ordinary Rwandans under colonial and post-colonial rule. In particular, it reformulates the violence against Tutsi in 1959, 1962 and 1973 and during the 1994 genocide as strictly ethnic in origin, thereby ignoring important class and regional dimensions of those conflicts. Instead, the programme of national unity and reconciliation reframes certain aspects of the genocide, while completely misrepresenting other elements, notably in its premise that the violence was the result of “seething ethnic hatred” of Tutsi rather than fear or opportunity (interview with senior RPF official, 2006). For example, the narrative of national unity and reconciliation ignores the fact that the labels Hutu, Tutsi and Twa represented status differences in pre-colonial Rwanda and overlooks the ways in which these labels became politically significant during the colonial period. In addition, it overlooks the ways in which Tutsi élites participated in and benefited from colonial rule. The narrative of national unity and reconciliation also depicts the events of 1959 as a “practice genocide” when in fact it was a social revolution of Hutu against the Tutsi élites (Kinzer, 2008: 11).
The programme of national unity and reconciliation uses this re-interpretation of history as a tool to shape the collective memory of how the genocide happened and the role of the RPF in stopping it while limiting the boundaries of acceptable public speech on the causes and consequences of the 1994 genocide. Notably, it is taboo to discuss the atrocities committed by the RPF during the genocide or speak of the partial responsibility of the RPF in creating the necessary conditions of fear and insecurity that in part caused the 1994 genocide. Instead, the RPF portrays its invasion as a necessary but principled battle on behalf of all Rwandans against the excesses of the Habyarimana regime. Rather than engage in frank discussion on what happened during the genocide, the RPF opts instead for a discourse which purports to restore Rwanda to the “peaceful harmony of pre-colonial days” (NURC, 2004a: 21), through re-education camps (ingando) about “what it means to be a Rwandan and how we used to live before the seeds of division were thrown down by the Belgians” (Office of the President, 1999a: 76). This interpretation allows the RPF to paint Tutsi as innocent victims who passively waited for the ethnic enmity of Hutu to be enacted, which in turn allows it to capitalise on its ability to liberate Rwanda from an oppressive and genocidal political leadership. This interpretation of the genocide legitimates the repressive approach of the post-genocide government in three ways: First, it invokes the heroic status of the RPF in liberating Rwandans from “oppressive rulers” (NURC, 2004a: 9). Second, it provides the RPF with a virtual carte blanche with which it can reconstruct Rwanda and “reconcile” Rwandans according to its own “vision of how things should be done” (MINECOFIN, 2000: 12); and third, it allows the RPF to continue to elide the specificity of their role in the genocide, while evoking the genocide guilt card with international audiences.
Finally, the programme of national unity and reconciliation does not acknowledge the lived experiences of most Rwandans: Tutsi and Twa perpetrators, Hutu and Twa rescuers; Tutsi, Hutu and Twa resisters; as well as Hutu and Twa survivors. The words of a Hutu woman widowed during the genocide sum up the situation well:
'For me, the genocide is what happened after the killing stopped. I lost my husband and four of my children during the events. Now I suffer without hopes and dreams. My brother is in prison, and I have no one to take care of or to take care of me. I feel alone even when I am with other people. And then the government forces us to tell the truth about what we saw. I saw a lot of bodies but never did I see someone getting killed. I heard people dying but I did not see anything. How can I tell my truth when the government has told me what I have to say? I fear being sent to prison and I think now that my neighbours do not like that I live in [the same community as before the genocide]. Where can I go, what can I do? The government says Rwanda has been rebuilt but my life and home are still not repaired…. (interview with Scholastique, a 54-year-old umutindi Hutu woman, 2006)'.
In presenting a particular set of facts about the genocide, the RPF is wiping away the specificity of individual acts of genocide, the death after death after death that are the aggregated whole. Such an approach ignores how ordinary Rwandans were enticed or coerced to participate. Each act of violence – a killing, a rape, a threat, a looting – is different and took place within a specific set of circumstances as individuals made their choice to kill, hide, resist, or stand by. This is not to downplay the magnitude of the genocide, but is to point out that in assigning collective responsibility to all Hutu, many of whom did not commit acts of genocide, the programme of national unity and reconciliation does more than simply misinterpret the nature of the genocide. It is likely to recreate, given Rwanda’s history of ethnic conflict, the same conditions of ethnic inequality and political repression that it claims to undo.
Thursday, October 14, 2010
Sunday, October 10, 2010
Rwanda's Response to the UN Mapping Report on the DRC
Yesterday, I received a copy of the Rwandan governments response to the Draft UN Mapping Report on the DRC. It is divided into five sections, all of which warrant reaction. I'll just make a few points as the Report is best read as a statement of the extent to which the RPF is losing international legitimacy.
Before going into some of the substance, I want to point out one consistent reaction from members of the Rwandan government. They do not deny that there its army killed civilians in the DRC, only that these killings do not constitute genocide. Indeed, the government's ineptitude at handling its response is uncharacteristic of its usual deft skill in "managing" bad press. It may be that so much negative yet accurate press has emerged in international sources the last year as the RPF cracks down on political opponents (both with its own party and outside challengers) human rights activists, journalists and other segments of civil society that there are serious cracks within the party machine. Time will tell.
There is a great deal in the government's rhetoric, both formally through the UN, and statements from government representatives in the regional and international media, that the fractures and fissures within the ruling RPF are becoming more apparent. At the same time, we see the lengths to which Kigali will go to defend its version of how the genocide happened, how the RPF stopped it and the successes of post-genocide reconstruction and reconciliation process.
I want to say too, that the RPF's emotive and excessive reaction to the UN Report seem to be the reaction of Kagame himself. He is known to be allergic to criticism while maintaining the moral authority of conviction (RPA were stopping genocide, not continuing it!) and insisting ad nauseum that his army was only doing what it had to do because of the inaction of the international community. I think the RPF's reaction is also reflective of a government that is losing its grip on power, and has little legitimacy among most Rwandans. The RPF is a party of factions, and only a few are reaping the benefits of power at the moment. This is the most worrying trend....
The Executive Summary of the Report says that its findings are unacceptable to the RPF, and that the allegations of mass murders are the result of the UN manipulating the true facts of the role of the RPF in eastern DRC. In particular, the Response notes that the publication of the Mapping Report might reignite conflict in Rwanda and in the Region. I think if any one actor is going to reignite conflict in the Region, it is the RPF itself.
The RPF's reaction to the historical context, and what happened during the 1994 genocide, are unoriginal. Anyone who has read Pottier (2002), Re-imaging Rwanda, particularly its chapter on how the RPF manages it public relations machinery will agree. The government has made similar assertions in public fora with interested audiences. It appears that the RPF is worried about losing face "in the court of public opinion" (para 5, p. 7). Yet its allegation that the UN leaked the Report out of spite (what it calls asymmetry) is false as it was a reporter with Le Monde that leaked the Report.
In the section The 1994 Rwandan Genocide is equally reactionary. First, there is sufficient empirical evidence to show that the RPA did not stop the genocide as early as it could of (para. 6, p. 7). Instead, it made calculated military moves to assure that it took power in Kigali while Tutsi (and Hutu and Twa) died. Two excellent books, Sibomana's Hope for Rwanda (1999) and Umutesi's Surviving the Slaughter (2004) provide sufficient counter-evidence to the RPF assertion that it directed all of its resources to stopping the genocide. Indeed, anyone aware of how the RPF acted in bad faith during the Arusha Accords will scoff as this section of the Response.
The section Mass Participation in the Genocide downplays the role of the RPF in helping to create the conditions for genocide. I want to make one thing clear. I do not buy into claims that have been circulating recently that the RPF organised the genocide. Instead, I take the argument of Straus (2006) in his The Order of Genocide that the civil war between the RPA and the FAR provided the necessary context of fear and insecurity that made the possibility of genocide by neighbours against neighbours possible, and indeed likely (as we now know with hindsight). I disagree with the assertion of the RPF that mostly young men committed acts of genocide. This is not a new assertion as the government's justice policy follows a logic of maximal prosecution (prosecution of all Hutu men of a particular age). This claim is, in my opinion, revisionist as it neglects the different motivations for killing as well as the strength of network and kinship ties in deciding who lived or died (Fujii, 2009, Webs of Violence).
The Response goes on for another 15 pages in which the RPF defends and justifies its actions in the DRC. I will end simply with this, the RPF doth protest too much.
Before going into some of the substance, I want to point out one consistent reaction from members of the Rwandan government. They do not deny that there its army killed civilians in the DRC, only that these killings do not constitute genocide. Indeed, the government's ineptitude at handling its response is uncharacteristic of its usual deft skill in "managing" bad press. It may be that so much negative yet accurate press has emerged in international sources the last year as the RPF cracks down on political opponents (both with its own party and outside challengers) human rights activists, journalists and other segments of civil society that there are serious cracks within the party machine. Time will tell.
There is a great deal in the government's rhetoric, both formally through the UN, and statements from government representatives in the regional and international media, that the fractures and fissures within the ruling RPF are becoming more apparent. At the same time, we see the lengths to which Kigali will go to defend its version of how the genocide happened, how the RPF stopped it and the successes of post-genocide reconstruction and reconciliation process.
I want to say too, that the RPF's emotive and excessive reaction to the UN Report seem to be the reaction of Kagame himself. He is known to be allergic to criticism while maintaining the moral authority of conviction (RPA were stopping genocide, not continuing it!) and insisting ad nauseum that his army was only doing what it had to do because of the inaction of the international community. I think the RPF's reaction is also reflective of a government that is losing its grip on power, and has little legitimacy among most Rwandans. The RPF is a party of factions, and only a few are reaping the benefits of power at the moment. This is the most worrying trend....
The Executive Summary of the Report says that its findings are unacceptable to the RPF, and that the allegations of mass murders are the result of the UN manipulating the true facts of the role of the RPF in eastern DRC. In particular, the Response notes that the publication of the Mapping Report might reignite conflict in Rwanda and in the Region. I think if any one actor is going to reignite conflict in the Region, it is the RPF itself.
The RPF's reaction to the historical context, and what happened during the 1994 genocide, are unoriginal. Anyone who has read Pottier (2002), Re-imaging Rwanda, particularly its chapter on how the RPF manages it public relations machinery will agree. The government has made similar assertions in public fora with interested audiences. It appears that the RPF is worried about losing face "in the court of public opinion" (para 5, p. 7). Yet its allegation that the UN leaked the Report out of spite (what it calls asymmetry) is false as it was a reporter with Le Monde that leaked the Report.
In the section The 1994 Rwandan Genocide is equally reactionary. First, there is sufficient empirical evidence to show that the RPA did not stop the genocide as early as it could of (para. 6, p. 7). Instead, it made calculated military moves to assure that it took power in Kigali while Tutsi (and Hutu and Twa) died. Two excellent books, Sibomana's Hope for Rwanda (1999) and Umutesi's Surviving the Slaughter (2004) provide sufficient counter-evidence to the RPF assertion that it directed all of its resources to stopping the genocide. Indeed, anyone aware of how the RPF acted in bad faith during the Arusha Accords will scoff as this section of the Response.
The section Mass Participation in the Genocide downplays the role of the RPF in helping to create the conditions for genocide. I want to make one thing clear. I do not buy into claims that have been circulating recently that the RPF organised the genocide. Instead, I take the argument of Straus (2006) in his The Order of Genocide that the civil war between the RPA and the FAR provided the necessary context of fear and insecurity that made the possibility of genocide by neighbours against neighbours possible, and indeed likely (as we now know with hindsight). I disagree with the assertion of the RPF that mostly young men committed acts of genocide. This is not a new assertion as the government's justice policy follows a logic of maximal prosecution (prosecution of all Hutu men of a particular age). This claim is, in my opinion, revisionist as it neglects the different motivations for killing as well as the strength of network and kinship ties in deciding who lived or died (Fujii, 2009, Webs of Violence).
The Response goes on for another 15 pages in which the RPF defends and justifies its actions in the DRC. I will end simply with this, the RPF doth protest too much.
Saturday, October 2, 2010
The hierarchy of ethnicity
So the UN Mapping Report was released yesterday. There has been a barrage of reaction, much of revealing of the political positions of the various actors, including "Hutu" politicians and activists and "Tutsi" politicians and survivor activists. These reactions are certainly valid but they don't tell the whole story. While none of us knows the whole story because of the nuanced complexities of the violence committed against and by various groups and individuals, I remain concerned about the continued and undifferentiated use of "Hutu" and "Tutsi" (among other categories). The use of ethnic language is reflective of a major conundrum within Rwandan politics in particular, and politics in the GLR more broadly. Speaking of Hutu- and Tutsi- deaths continues the politics of othering that feeds the culture of impunity in the Region.
What I mean is that I sense of lack of commitment to human rights for ALL individuals, regardless of ethnicity, in the discourse and rhetoric of politicians and activists of all stripes. In other words, I have yet to hear any of the key actors in Rwanda and Congo talk about the importance of stopping the killing of poor, peasant people who are caught between armed groups, and who, more often than not, are caught up the violence and related circumstances (hunger, disease, displacement, etc) that they themselves do not create.
Instead, the rhetoric and action of powerful actors and decision-makers in the region continues to scapegoat peace in the language of ethnicity. The UN mapping report reveals the extent to which the politics of ethnic hierarchy (meaning that the lives of some are more valuable that others on the basis of ethnicity, and dare I say it, social and economic status) continues to dominate in Rwanda and the GLR. The RPF is skilled at claim a post-ethnic society when it facts its use of the language of ethnic unity creates difference and division on the basis of ethnicity.
So, for me, the UN Mapping Report does not represent an explosive exposee of what the RPF and other actors did on Congolese soil against resident populations. Nor does it present an alternative narrative. For me, and I assume others how follow political developments in the region, knowledge of what is contained in the Report is widely known. I see the politics of genocide manipulation that the RPF has followed since assuming power. I also see the ways in which opponents of the RPF manipulate its manipulation of the genocide for their own political gain. I recognise that suppression of UN and other reports on the excesses of the RPF against ordinary people because of other suppressed documentation like the Gersony report from late 1994. (See the excellent article by French and Gettlemen on Rwanda's relationship with the UN and its ability to craft a specific narrative of the genocide).
The key question, for me at least, is what now? Will the shine come off RPF rule? Will the Report expose its excesses in Congo and Rwanda against its opponents (of all political stripes and ethnicities)? Will international actors begin to push Kigali to open up political space? If so, to what effect? Indeed, significant in Kigali's reaction to the Report are the thinly veiled threats of renewed violence against those who challenge its version of history about how it stopped the genocide and restored peace and security to Rwanda (see the remarks of both Kagame and Mushikiwabo). How far can international actors reasonably push Kagame before he begins to react against his opponents? The list of questions goes on...
I'd like to see the international community -- policy makers, academics, journalists, activists and other -- begin to push Kagame and his RPF to open up to criticism of its actions and policy. Take a carrots and sticks approach that includes discussion of respect for all in region, regardless of ethnicity.
What I mean is that I sense of lack of commitment to human rights for ALL individuals, regardless of ethnicity, in the discourse and rhetoric of politicians and activists of all stripes. In other words, I have yet to hear any of the key actors in Rwanda and Congo talk about the importance of stopping the killing of poor, peasant people who are caught between armed groups, and who, more often than not, are caught up the violence and related circumstances (hunger, disease, displacement, etc) that they themselves do not create.
Instead, the rhetoric and action of powerful actors and decision-makers in the region continues to scapegoat peace in the language of ethnicity. The UN mapping report reveals the extent to which the politics of ethnic hierarchy (meaning that the lives of some are more valuable that others on the basis of ethnicity, and dare I say it, social and economic status) continues to dominate in Rwanda and the GLR. The RPF is skilled at claim a post-ethnic society when it facts its use of the language of ethnic unity creates difference and division on the basis of ethnicity.
So, for me, the UN Mapping Report does not represent an explosive exposee of what the RPF and other actors did on Congolese soil against resident populations. Nor does it present an alternative narrative. For me, and I assume others how follow political developments in the region, knowledge of what is contained in the Report is widely known. I see the politics of genocide manipulation that the RPF has followed since assuming power. I also see the ways in which opponents of the RPF manipulate its manipulation of the genocide for their own political gain. I recognise that suppression of UN and other reports on the excesses of the RPF against ordinary people because of other suppressed documentation like the Gersony report from late 1994. (See the excellent article by French and Gettlemen on Rwanda's relationship with the UN and its ability to craft a specific narrative of the genocide).
The key question, for me at least, is what now? Will the shine come off RPF rule? Will the Report expose its excesses in Congo and Rwanda against its opponents (of all political stripes and ethnicities)? Will international actors begin to push Kigali to open up political space? If so, to what effect? Indeed, significant in Kigali's reaction to the Report are the thinly veiled threats of renewed violence against those who challenge its version of history about how it stopped the genocide and restored peace and security to Rwanda (see the remarks of both Kagame and Mushikiwabo). How far can international actors reasonably push Kagame before he begins to react against his opponents? The list of questions goes on...
I'd like to see the international community -- policy makers, academics, journalists, activists and other -- begin to push Kagame and his RPF to open up to criticism of its actions and policy. Take a carrots and sticks approach that includes discussion of respect for all in region, regardless of ethnicity.
Monday, August 9, 2010
Rwanda's real challenge
As predicted by friends and foes alike, Paul Kagame has been re-elected by a landslide. This is no surprise as the opposition was silenced. Some critics assume that because Kagame and his RPF did not allow the opposition to register as formal political parties that the major crisis facing Rwanda is its weak political opposition. I have never thought this was a major consideration as there is very little chance of political power to pass democratically. The opposition is divided, has no meaningful or even distinct platform, and likely has little support among elites and peasant folks alike (we don't actually know because no one has asked Rwandans themselves what they think).
The real issue now that the elections are over is the undeniable emergence of a power struggle within the ruling RPF. This has not been reported upon in any meaningful way. Partly, I'm sure, because critical academics and journalists have yet to interview the main actors. We are working with newspaper interviews, and Kagame's reaction to these public offerings in campaign speeches and during his monthly meeting with journalists based in Kigali.
What we do know is that since the RPF took power in 1994, it has continued to consolidate power in its own hands. We don't know the political intentions or power base of those that have fallen out with Kagame.
Most significant is Kagame's sidelining of much of the RPFs military elite. These include several senior officers who were in the bush with Kagame, and who arguably had a role in forming the then-rebel RPF. These include, among others, General Sam Kaka and General Frank Rusagara. In 2001, General Kayumba Nyamwasa also fell out with Kagame, as well, and in 2005 the head of external intelligence Colonel Patrick Karegeya was arrested on allegations of insubordination.
This much is widely known. The divisions with the RPF came to a head when General Kayumba fled into exile in South Africa. In addition, two other generals (Karake and Muhire) were arrested, accused of masterminding the grenade attacks that happened in the spring. In sum, most of the senior RPF military brass from 1994 have fled into exile or have been arrested (a few have retired and have been relieved of their duties).
There are two possible explanations -- one from the government camp, and the other from the dissidents themselves. First, senior government officials are on the record saying that senior military officers have been pushed to the sidelines because they do not share Kagame's development vision. Senior bureaucrats, in keeping with the party line, explain the divisions as the result of the moral weakness of these generals. They are not interested in a peaceful, stable and secure Rwanda like Kagame; instead they are interested in only their own wealth and political power. This explanation is hardly rocket science to analysts as each of these generals have been marginalized on accusations of corruption, embezzlement or insubordination (to Kagame himself, I suppose).
The explanation from the dissidents is that their grievances are political. Kagame has consolidated power in his hands to such an extent that even a whisper of disagreement is considered treason. Both Nyamwasa and Karegeya say that Kagame is incapable of listening to their opinions.
The truth probably lies somewhere in between. One thing is more certain: the power struggle among the RPFs inner circle could signal the end of Kagame's reign. It would also like happen at the end of a gun rather than through the ballot box.
For those of that care about peace and security in Rwanda, the question now becomes does Kagame command the respect of his peers within the RPF? If he doesn't, under what conditions will Kagame begin to loosen his presumed grip on political power?
In addition, can those senior military officials that have fled the country mount a real threat to Kagame's power?
The real issue now that the elections are over is the undeniable emergence of a power struggle within the ruling RPF. This has not been reported upon in any meaningful way. Partly, I'm sure, because critical academics and journalists have yet to interview the main actors. We are working with newspaper interviews, and Kagame's reaction to these public offerings in campaign speeches and during his monthly meeting with journalists based in Kigali.
What we do know is that since the RPF took power in 1994, it has continued to consolidate power in its own hands. We don't know the political intentions or power base of those that have fallen out with Kagame.
Most significant is Kagame's sidelining of much of the RPFs military elite. These include several senior officers who were in the bush with Kagame, and who arguably had a role in forming the then-rebel RPF. These include, among others, General Sam Kaka and General Frank Rusagara. In 2001, General Kayumba Nyamwasa also fell out with Kagame, as well, and in 2005 the head of external intelligence Colonel Patrick Karegeya was arrested on allegations of insubordination.
This much is widely known. The divisions with the RPF came to a head when General Kayumba fled into exile in South Africa. In addition, two other generals (Karake and Muhire) were arrested, accused of masterminding the grenade attacks that happened in the spring. In sum, most of the senior RPF military brass from 1994 have fled into exile or have been arrested (a few have retired and have been relieved of their duties).
There are two possible explanations -- one from the government camp, and the other from the dissidents themselves. First, senior government officials are on the record saying that senior military officers have been pushed to the sidelines because they do not share Kagame's development vision. Senior bureaucrats, in keeping with the party line, explain the divisions as the result of the moral weakness of these generals. They are not interested in a peaceful, stable and secure Rwanda like Kagame; instead they are interested in only their own wealth and political power. This explanation is hardly rocket science to analysts as each of these generals have been marginalized on accusations of corruption, embezzlement or insubordination (to Kagame himself, I suppose).
The explanation from the dissidents is that their grievances are political. Kagame has consolidated power in his hands to such an extent that even a whisper of disagreement is considered treason. Both Nyamwasa and Karegeya say that Kagame is incapable of listening to their opinions.
The truth probably lies somewhere in between. One thing is more certain: the power struggle among the RPFs inner circle could signal the end of Kagame's reign. It would also like happen at the end of a gun rather than through the ballot box.
For those of that care about peace and security in Rwanda, the question now becomes does Kagame command the respect of his peers within the RPF? If he doesn't, under what conditions will Kagame begin to loosen his presumed grip on political power?
In addition, can those senior military officials that have fled the country mount a real threat to Kagame's power?
Tuesday, August 3, 2010
Kagame will win the elections. Then what?
This post was originally published by the website Op-Ed News on 3 August 2010.
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has called upon Rwandan President Paul Kagame to investigate the politically motivated killings of opposition politicians and critical journalists in the run-up to the country's 9 August election. American Secretary of State Clinton recently encouraged the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front not to act against opposition politicians. These calls, however, are too little too late, as Kagame will handily win.
This raises the question of how international actors can work with the incumbent President knowing that he is a predator of political and press freedoms. It is now opportune for Western donors to revisit their support for Kagame as well as their role in Rwanda's reconstruction and reconciliation processes.
Rwanda's donors, including the US, the UK, the European Union and the UN, must continue to nudge the RPF towards a real democratic opening. This must include more than investigations to the RPFs pre-election campaign of intimidation and harassment of its opposition and calls for free and fair elections. Rwanda's donors must press Kagame to create space for national dialogue, meaning an open and safe space where Rwandans of all ethnicities and from all walks of life can meet to discuss what happened to whom during the genocide, and to strategize ways forward from the hurt of the past. The donor community must encourage Kagame to adopt inclusive policies that will create a common future of economic security and political stability for all Rwandans. Such a space could be framed in patriotic terms of being Rwandan -- rather than in the language of ethnic unity as is currently the case - as love of country is more salient for many of the Rwandans I've consulted over the years.
There are three things that western donors can do to encourage President Kagame to create a more open and peaceful political culture once he is re-elected.
First is to question the government's ability to manage Rwanda's natural resources -- its people and its land. The US State Department estimates that by 2020, Rwanda will be home to some 13 million people. This gives Rwanda the highest population density in Africa with 225 people per square mile. Some 90% of Rwandans seek out their existence as subsistence farmers and are the first to suffer when the central government is unable to respond to their daily needs. The government requires rural farmers to grow coffee and tea instead of the crops needed to feed their families. A new land policy has decreased peasant holdings to less than a half-acre. The RPF does not allow peasant farmers to voice their concerns with its agriculture and the inequitable distribution of land into the hands of government loyalists.
There is no room for debate on appropriate technologies to build sustainable agriculture in the country. An underfed and disaffected local population is hardly the way forward to sustainable peace and democracy. Donors must continue to work with the RPF to ensure their agriculture and land policies are aimed at developing long-term peace and security, not quick gains for party loyalists.
Second is to encourage open dialogue and a culture of constructive criticism and debate about government policies amongst the political class. Foreigners write most of the academic and policy literature on Rwanda. Why? Because Kagame does not allow for thoughtful analysis that strays from the RPF's official rhetoric that only Tutsi died during the 1994 genocide. This may appear counter-intuitive to those donors who have visited Rwanda's universities -- indeed they are flourishing thanks to foreign aid dollars. Donors can use their already existing relationship with Rwanda's Ministry of Education and other institutions of higher learning to sponsor intellectuals whose ideas differ from those of the government as a way to spur openness and dialogue.
Third is to encourage Kagame to engage the diverse political views of the Rwandan Diaspora. This is not to suggest that he engage the extremist views of those that advocate the thesis that the RPF organized and implemented the genocide and other negative views. Instead, he needs to acknowledge that such negative opinion exists along side with the positive involvement of the Diaspora in Rwanda's economic development. Because the Diaspora contributed almost $130 million to Rwanda's economy in 2008 (second only to tourist receipts), Western donors have failed to seriously push Kagame to engage dissident opinion within the Diaspora. Fueled by the internet, sincere dissidents who criticize RPF policy exist alongside political extremists such as the FDLR (Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda) rebel group, making it easy for Kagame to justify not including them in the Rwandan political sphere. Western donors must encourage Kagame to engage with all sectors of the Diaspora, good and bad, as part of the broader strategy of political openness and dialogue.
Paul Kagame will be Rwanda's next President. Now is the time to reassess donor policy in the country to push for meaningful democratic.
Take action -- click here to contact your local newspaper or congress people:
Push for Political Openness in Rwanda
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has called upon Rwandan President Paul Kagame to investigate the politically motivated killings of opposition politicians and critical journalists in the run-up to the country's 9 August election. American Secretary of State Clinton recently encouraged the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front not to act against opposition politicians. These calls, however, are too little too late, as Kagame will handily win.
This raises the question of how international actors can work with the incumbent President knowing that he is a predator of political and press freedoms. It is now opportune for Western donors to revisit their support for Kagame as well as their role in Rwanda's reconstruction and reconciliation processes.
Rwanda's donors, including the US, the UK, the European Union and the UN, must continue to nudge the RPF towards a real democratic opening. This must include more than investigations to the RPFs pre-election campaign of intimidation and harassment of its opposition and calls for free and fair elections. Rwanda's donors must press Kagame to create space for national dialogue, meaning an open and safe space where Rwandans of all ethnicities and from all walks of life can meet to discuss what happened to whom during the genocide, and to strategize ways forward from the hurt of the past. The donor community must encourage Kagame to adopt inclusive policies that will create a common future of economic security and political stability for all Rwandans. Such a space could be framed in patriotic terms of being Rwandan -- rather than in the language of ethnic unity as is currently the case - as love of country is more salient for many of the Rwandans I've consulted over the years.
There are three things that western donors can do to encourage President Kagame to create a more open and peaceful political culture once he is re-elected.
First is to question the government's ability to manage Rwanda's natural resources -- its people and its land. The US State Department estimates that by 2020, Rwanda will be home to some 13 million people. This gives Rwanda the highest population density in Africa with 225 people per square mile. Some 90% of Rwandans seek out their existence as subsistence farmers and are the first to suffer when the central government is unable to respond to their daily needs. The government requires rural farmers to grow coffee and tea instead of the crops needed to feed their families. A new land policy has decreased peasant holdings to less than a half-acre. The RPF does not allow peasant farmers to voice their concerns with its agriculture and the inequitable distribution of land into the hands of government loyalists.
There is no room for debate on appropriate technologies to build sustainable agriculture in the country. An underfed and disaffected local population is hardly the way forward to sustainable peace and democracy. Donors must continue to work with the RPF to ensure their agriculture and land policies are aimed at developing long-term peace and security, not quick gains for party loyalists.
Second is to encourage open dialogue and a culture of constructive criticism and debate about government policies amongst the political class. Foreigners write most of the academic and policy literature on Rwanda. Why? Because Kagame does not allow for thoughtful analysis that strays from the RPF's official rhetoric that only Tutsi died during the 1994 genocide. This may appear counter-intuitive to those donors who have visited Rwanda's universities -- indeed they are flourishing thanks to foreign aid dollars. Donors can use their already existing relationship with Rwanda's Ministry of Education and other institutions of higher learning to sponsor intellectuals whose ideas differ from those of the government as a way to spur openness and dialogue.
Third is to encourage Kagame to engage the diverse political views of the Rwandan Diaspora. This is not to suggest that he engage the extremist views of those that advocate the thesis that the RPF organized and implemented the genocide and other negative views. Instead, he needs to acknowledge that such negative opinion exists along side with the positive involvement of the Diaspora in Rwanda's economic development. Because the Diaspora contributed almost $130 million to Rwanda's economy in 2008 (second only to tourist receipts), Western donors have failed to seriously push Kagame to engage dissident opinion within the Diaspora. Fueled by the internet, sincere dissidents who criticize RPF policy exist alongside political extremists such as the FDLR (Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda) rebel group, making it easy for Kagame to justify not including them in the Rwandan political sphere. Western donors must encourage Kagame to engage with all sectors of the Diaspora, good and bad, as part of the broader strategy of political openness and dialogue.
Paul Kagame will be Rwanda's next President. Now is the time to reassess donor policy in the country to push for meaningful democratic.
Take action -- click here to contact your local newspaper or congress people:
Push for Political Openness in Rwanda
Saturday, July 31, 2010
Whither International Responsibility in Rwanda?
(This post is written by a colleague, and she asked me to post it here.)
Slightly under two years ago, an expert roundtable was convened by the International Peace Institute, the UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, and InterAfrica Group to revitalise the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the Prevention of Genocide in Africa. R2P is an ambitious set of principles that aims to prevent genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. It came about after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda once it was clear the international community failed so tremendously in adhering to the ideal of “never again” that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan asked: when do we become responsible?
It seems as if we still don’t know the answer.
This past April, as Rwanda commemorated 16 years since approximately 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were murdered in less than 100 days, the Special Adviser with a focus on R2P restated the world’s commitment to preventing mass atrocity. Speaking on behalf of current UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, he said: “We can and must do better in the 21st century... Complacency is our enemy, and vigilance our friend”. Yet a cursory look at the lead-in to Rwanda’s upcoming presidential elections indicates that just as in 1994, with tensions climbing and violence on the rise, the international community is choosing to look the other way.
In Rwanda, survivors and perpetrators of genocide comprise the majority of the population. Ethnicity remains deeply politicized and ethnic conflict is a living memory. However, since the last presidential elections in 2003, people have been required to eliminate public forms and expressions of ethnic identification. The RPF government, which controls most state institutions, has prohibited claims for ethnic representation in politics, education, and the economic sector in the name of preventing “divisionism” and “genocide ideology.” Those who criticize or question the government’s policies are arrested, killed or disappeared. President Kagame and the RPF regime justify such actions as necessary for preventing another genocide, but what sort of peace is built on a foundation of repression? If Rwanda’s history indicates anything, it is that long-simmering inequalities do not go away on their own; rather, they burn at slow pace until the cauldron bursts and violence erupts.
Many praise Rwanda for its social and developmental achievements without recognizing that the proceeds of economic gain are largely serving to further the interests of Kagame’s elite, English-speaking Tutsi minority, most of who grew up in neighboring Uganda. Secretary Clinton described Rwanda as “a beacon of hope for other African nations” and Philip Gourevitch, in a recent New Yorker article, wrote that in Rwanda, “The reconciliation defies expectations.” Further, in the last two years, President Kagame has been named one of Financial Times’ 50 greatest leaders of the past decade, a Time Magazine Man of the Year, winner of the Clinton Global Citizens Award for Leadership in Public Service, and winner of the International Medal of Peace. Rwanda was the World Bank’s top reformer of 2009 and was accepted in to the Commonwealth last November.
How is it that diplomats and journalists alike are continuing to ignore the tragic realities of life for the average Rwandan? While Kigali is gleaming, 90 percent of the population is mired in poverty; mostly these are Hutu, but Tutsi not connected to the RPF regime suffer tremendously as well. However, to challenge a system that perpetuates such inequalities means almost-certain imprisonment, if not death. Rwanda, following closely behind the US and Russia, has the third largest incarceration rate in the world. Where is our vigilance? When will we speak out for those who unable to speak for themselves?
It is clear that violence is increasing as we near this summer’s elections: in the last month alone, there was an attempted assassination of Lt General Nyamwasa in South Africa who, along with several other senior military officials, had fled Rwanda after disagreements with President Kagame. Almost immediately afterward, the newspaper editor who called for an investigation in to the General’s death was gunned down in front of his home in Kigali. Another editor in Rwanda was arrested on charges of defaming the president and espousing genocide ideology one week later.
Yet the voices quashed are not just those of the Rwandan media: A Human Rights Watch researcher was recently expelled, American law professor Peter Erlinder was arrested in May while preparing a case for charges of genocide denial against opposition presidential candidate Victoire Ingabire, and she herself, in addition to other serious contenders for president and their supporters, was charged with genocide ideology and banned from registering her candidacy. Two weeks ago, Green Party candidate Andre Kagwa Rwisereka was found nearly decapitated in South Rwanda, his body dumped on the side of the road. Still Kagame, with US and UN support, maintains that the story of Rwanda since the genocide is one of success and prosperity.
Whither our responsibility?
Certainly, there is no easy solution; it would be wrong for the US and UN to push open the doors of democracy and force Rwanda to hold free and fair elections. It is also too late to even try; such an act would be dangerous not only for American interests in East Africa (a whole other quagmire) but for average Rwandans who continue to suffer under a regime that manipulates the worst of its history to further oppression in the present. We should not, however, stand idly by, either. Those who care about “never again” should at least begin by advocating for political dialogue in Rwanda, pressing for open economic opportunities, and supporting freedom of speech and conscience in a country where talking politics in a way the government does not approve means that your life is at risk. Indeed, if we are not vigilant about our responsibility to protect, another round of mass political violence in Rwanda will be the shame of us all.
To get involved in this important issue, contact the office of Senator Russ Feingold, chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs (http://feingold.senate.gov/contact_opinion.html).
Slightly under two years ago, an expert roundtable was convened by the International Peace Institute, the UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, and InterAfrica Group to revitalise the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the Prevention of Genocide in Africa. R2P is an ambitious set of principles that aims to prevent genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. It came about after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda once it was clear the international community failed so tremendously in adhering to the ideal of “never again” that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan asked: when do we become responsible?
It seems as if we still don’t know the answer.
This past April, as Rwanda commemorated 16 years since approximately 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were murdered in less than 100 days, the Special Adviser with a focus on R2P restated the world’s commitment to preventing mass atrocity. Speaking on behalf of current UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, he said: “We can and must do better in the 21st century... Complacency is our enemy, and vigilance our friend”. Yet a cursory look at the lead-in to Rwanda’s upcoming presidential elections indicates that just as in 1994, with tensions climbing and violence on the rise, the international community is choosing to look the other way.
In Rwanda, survivors and perpetrators of genocide comprise the majority of the population. Ethnicity remains deeply politicized and ethnic conflict is a living memory. However, since the last presidential elections in 2003, people have been required to eliminate public forms and expressions of ethnic identification. The RPF government, which controls most state institutions, has prohibited claims for ethnic representation in politics, education, and the economic sector in the name of preventing “divisionism” and “genocide ideology.” Those who criticize or question the government’s policies are arrested, killed or disappeared. President Kagame and the RPF regime justify such actions as necessary for preventing another genocide, but what sort of peace is built on a foundation of repression? If Rwanda’s history indicates anything, it is that long-simmering inequalities do not go away on their own; rather, they burn at slow pace until the cauldron bursts and violence erupts.
Many praise Rwanda for its social and developmental achievements without recognizing that the proceeds of economic gain are largely serving to further the interests of Kagame’s elite, English-speaking Tutsi minority, most of who grew up in neighboring Uganda. Secretary Clinton described Rwanda as “a beacon of hope for other African nations” and Philip Gourevitch, in a recent New Yorker article, wrote that in Rwanda, “The reconciliation defies expectations.” Further, in the last two years, President Kagame has been named one of Financial Times’ 50 greatest leaders of the past decade, a Time Magazine Man of the Year, winner of the Clinton Global Citizens Award for Leadership in Public Service, and winner of the International Medal of Peace. Rwanda was the World Bank’s top reformer of 2009 and was accepted in to the Commonwealth last November.
How is it that diplomats and journalists alike are continuing to ignore the tragic realities of life for the average Rwandan? While Kigali is gleaming, 90 percent of the population is mired in poverty; mostly these are Hutu, but Tutsi not connected to the RPF regime suffer tremendously as well. However, to challenge a system that perpetuates such inequalities means almost-certain imprisonment, if not death. Rwanda, following closely behind the US and Russia, has the third largest incarceration rate in the world. Where is our vigilance? When will we speak out for those who unable to speak for themselves?
It is clear that violence is increasing as we near this summer’s elections: in the last month alone, there was an attempted assassination of Lt General Nyamwasa in South Africa who, along with several other senior military officials, had fled Rwanda after disagreements with President Kagame. Almost immediately afterward, the newspaper editor who called for an investigation in to the General’s death was gunned down in front of his home in Kigali. Another editor in Rwanda was arrested on charges of defaming the president and espousing genocide ideology one week later.
Yet the voices quashed are not just those of the Rwandan media: A Human Rights Watch researcher was recently expelled, American law professor Peter Erlinder was arrested in May while preparing a case for charges of genocide denial against opposition presidential candidate Victoire Ingabire, and she herself, in addition to other serious contenders for president and their supporters, was charged with genocide ideology and banned from registering her candidacy. Two weeks ago, Green Party candidate Andre Kagwa Rwisereka was found nearly decapitated in South Rwanda, his body dumped on the side of the road. Still Kagame, with US and UN support, maintains that the story of Rwanda since the genocide is one of success and prosperity.
Whither our responsibility?
Certainly, there is no easy solution; it would be wrong for the US and UN to push open the doors of democracy and force Rwanda to hold free and fair elections. It is also too late to even try; such an act would be dangerous not only for American interests in East Africa (a whole other quagmire) but for average Rwandans who continue to suffer under a regime that manipulates the worst of its history to further oppression in the present. We should not, however, stand idly by, either. Those who care about “never again” should at least begin by advocating for political dialogue in Rwanda, pressing for open economic opportunities, and supporting freedom of speech and conscience in a country where talking politics in a way the government does not approve means that your life is at risk. Indeed, if we are not vigilant about our responsibility to protect, another round of mass political violence in Rwanda will be the shame of us all.
To get involved in this important issue, contact the office of Senator Russ Feingold, chairman of the Subcommittee on African Affairs (http://feingold.senate.gov/contact_opinion.html).
Tuesday, July 20, 2010
Collateral Damage: First published in the Mail & Guardian
Rwandans will soon go to the polls to elect a president. The incumbent, Paul Kagame, head of the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front, continues to exert total control over the country's election process.
Kagame, who came to power as the leader of a rebel army, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), that ended the 1994 genocide, legitimised his rule in 2003 when he won the presidential elections with 95% of the vote. Anywhere else in Africa, and indeed the world, such a result would indicate that Kagame was hardly elected in free and fair elections. Despite the fact that Amnesty International, the European Union, Human Rights Watch and the United Nations found serious irregularities and widespread oppression in the elections, Kagame won praise from major donors such as the United States and the United Kingdom for his thoughtful and benevolent leadership of Rwanda's rebirth as a model recipient of international aid.
In advance of the upcoming presidential elections, many within the international community have remained supportive of Rwanda's so-called "democratic transition". They seem to ignore the widespread arrests of journalists and opposition politicians, the closing of independent Rwandan newspapers, ejection of a Human Rights Watch researcher, an assassination attempt against exiled General Kayumba Nyamasa who had a falling out with Kagame, and the killing of journalist Jean-Leonard Rugambage who attempted to report on the assassination attempt in the online version of a Rwandan newspaper whose print edition had been closed down by the government.
'No government is perfect'
While diplomats and policymakers from some countries, like Sweden and The Netherlands, have cut their aid, others like the United States and the United Kingdom continue to publicly support Kagame. As an American diplomat currently based in Kigali said, "Of course this government is not perfect. But no government is. The position of many in the diplomatic corps is to gently nudge the RPF towards democracy." In other words, key donors like the US and the UK view the continued harassment and intimidation of political opponents and critical journalists as par for the course in the transition from civil war and genocide to democracy.
While diplomats quietly acknowledge this repression of elites, there is no public acknowledgement of the impact of the elections on average Rwandans.
In Rwanda, politics is the preserve of elite actors, who represent about 10% of the population. Average Rwandans such as rural farmers, teachers, nurses, low level civil servants, traders, or soldiers who make up the remaining 90% of the population have virtually no say in politics. In November 2009 a group of rural farmers resident in southern Rwanda sought to register a new political party to put forward their own presidential candidate. Several of them were arrested without charge, and the presumed organisers remain in prison; the rest fled to neighbouring Burundi. Indeed, average Rwandans are the first to suffer when elites use all available tactics to gain political power. As the Swahili proverb goes, "When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers".
Silencing critical voices
A climate of fear and insecurity predominates in the everyday life of average Rwandans. Anyone who questions RPF policies or its treatment of its opposition and critics can be beaten, harrassed or intimidated into submission. Those who are perceived as sympathetic to the political opposition can be arrested, "disappeared", or like Rugambage, murdered. The number of political prisoners as well as those who have disappeared is unknown. Human Rights Watch reports that repression of political freedoms in a strategy of the RPF to "silence critical voices and independent reporting before the elections".
The strategy of repression means that none of the three main opposition parties -- Democratic Green Party of Rwanda, FDU-Inkingi and PS-Imberakuri -- are able to take part in the elections. Distant family members of opposition politicians and critical journalists find themselves under constant surveillance. As a result, the vast majority of the population waits silently and anxiously for the elections, hoping that they are perceived as model citizens so as to avoid attracting unwanted attention from government loyalists.
Rwandans are more than skeptical about the government's commitment to democracy. They recognise the upcoming presidential elections as a form of social control to ensure they vote for the right party (meaning Kagame's RPF). As an aide to the minister of local government said, "In 2010, the people will also vote as we instruct them. This means that those who vote against us understand that they can be left behind. To embrace democracy is to embrace the development ideas of President Kagame".
Average Rwandans interpret democracy as a form of repression. A male university student told me, "Oh, we understand that voting is not something done freely. Since the middle of 2009, students are told to take an oath of loyalty to the RPF. This means that we have to join the RPF -- if we don't we don't have any opportunities to get a job or get married or have any kind of life really. In Rwanda, democracy means to understand that the power of the RPF is absolute." A rural woman who lost her husband in the 1994 genocide told me a similar tale, "Democracy is something the government says we need when they fear losing their power. We heard this before the genocide, and we hear it now. Democracy would be OK if regular people like me could actually participate rather than being told whom to vote for and when."
For average Rwandans, democracy is the domain of the elite, who intimidate and harass the rural population into parroting the so-called democratic ideals of the RPF. This democracy is an alienating and oppressive daily reality -- something which could crystallise into violence in early August 2010 when Rwandans go to the polls again. The words of a Rwandan colleague are emblematic, "Anyone who has the means to do so is getting out of the country. For those of us who can't , we just hope the elections are without violence. When the government can imprison or kill anyone they please, we are all nervous because it means none of us is safe ...".
Susan Thomson is a Five Colleges Professor, funded by the Andrew W Mellon Foundation at Hampshire College, Amherst, Massachusetts. She has been researching state-society relations in Rwanda since 1996 and is the author of numerous publications on the country.
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