The Empirical Record on Habyarimana's Death

On 1 October 2011, Rwanda National Congress co-founder, Theogene Rudasingwa confirmed that his former Rwandan Patriotic Front colleague, Paul Kagame, is personally responsible for downing Habyarimana's plane -- the event that initiated the Rwandan genocide. Certain segments of the Disapora lit up social media sites with sentiments of praise and relief at the willingness and ability of Dr. Rudasingwa to express what has long been an open secret in Rwanda. The academic and policy worlds, in careful assessments of the available empirical record had established as early at 2000 that Kagame ordered the downing of Habyarimana's in a bid to secure political power, not to save Tutsi lives. A good representative article is Kuperman's 2004 "Provoking Genocide: A revised history of the Rwandan Patriotic Front". Indeed, more careful academic work from Guichaoua and Straus suggests that the military actions of the RPF along with its unwillingness to negotiate in good faith at the Arusha Peace Accords, combined with the surprise downing of Habyriamana's plane, meant that extremist elements within the interim government only planned the genocide on the evening of 6 April 1994.

There has been virtually no response from Kigali on Rudasingwa's allegation, although I hear from trusted sources that Kagame is fuming mad. A representative reaction that minimises the historical importance of the downing of Habyarimana's plane comes from one of the many journalists known to be in Kigali's employ, Frederick Golooba-Mutebi. Golooba-Mutebi's article makes the requisite personal attacks on Rudasingawa, urging him to notice that his position is one that divides Rwandans, and is rooted in colonial thinking that promoted exclusionary politics in the first place. As is standard in government-sponsored media, Golooba-Mutebi does not directly engage the empirical claims of Rudasingwa's article; instead he launches into a standard government narrative of the root causes of the genocide, seeking to strip Kagame's personal accountability and minimise the importance of engaging Rudasingwa's allegations.

I think both sides of the 'Who-Downed-the-Plane' debate miss a larger point that is important for Rwandans to know as they seek to build an inclusive polity (the stated goal of both the RPF and the RNC). What happened that day in Arusha, during the power sharing discussions, that made 6 April 1994 the day to bring down Habyarimana's plane? There is no available transcript of the 6 April talks that I've ever been able to find, and folks like Rudasingwa, with intimate knowledge of the political and military posturing and strategy of the RPF before, during and immediately after the genocide, are well placed to reveal something more than which actors downed the plane that started the genocide.

If they could introduce new empirical evidence on why the downing of the plane was the defining event that launched the genocide, and on the motivations and political interests of all the actors to the Arusha Accords (including international observers), we could break ground that not only reveals the culpability of key RPF actors in downing Habyarimana's plane, but shows the political machinations of political leaders in both the Habyarimana and interim regimes that carried out genocide. It could also reveal that the RPF are not the saviours of post-genocide Rwanda, and that its leaders are also responsible for crimes against humanity and war crimes. Without a sincere reckoning of why Habyarimana's plane went down when it did, and why, a big part of the puzzle is missing. Can the RNC and other political actors flesh out the empirical record? Will they?

Similarities between Habyarimana and Kagame

As the rhetoric of genocide denial and other forms of threats and intimidation that representatives of the RPF continue to put into the public domain heats up, in and out of Rwanda, it seems a good time to reflect on Kagame's leadership style. Central to the international legitimacy that the RPF enjoys is that it is made of up of "good guys" who stopped the 1994. This of course masks the role of the RPF in its own crimes of against humanity, and war crimes before, during and after the genocide. That is a different issue for a different post. Continued international praise, most recently from Tony Blair in The Guardian continues this trend of international tolerance for the human rights excesses of Kagame's regime. Seeing the RPF as the good guys leads many international observers, Tony Blair and others included, to see a radical break in leadership styles between the pre- and post-genocide periods. To this I say, hooey.

A colleague and I recently finished a paper that is currently under review on the similarities in leadership style of both Habyarimana and Kagame. Part and parcel of post-genocide leadership is the assertion of President Paul Kagame that his ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) offers a new way of governing Rwanda so that the "scourge of genocide never again happens" in the country. My colleague and I, among many other observers and analysts of Rwanda's politics, would also like to see the killing stop. Unfortunately, our research shows that Habyarimana and Kagame regimes share the same authoritarian concerns with power and control of Rwandan society.

Using the concept of 'benevolent leadership', we argue that there is considerable continuity in the Kagame regime with the techniques of power employed during the Habyarimana regime. The key similarity is that both President actively seek to maintain a defined and gaping distance between elites (those ‘in the know’) and the population (those needing ‘guidance’), and reinforces the boundaries of socio-political hierarchy between political elites and ordinary Rwandans. Reminding Rwandans of hierarchy, authority, and of the need for obedience, this style of leadership aims to limit popular dissent and stimulate support on the part of the population. We argue that elite projections of a ‘benevolent leadership’ have been a tool not only to help authoritarian governments win over the international community, but also to try discipline the Rwandan population.

Our paper won't be published for another six to twelve months, publishing cycles being what they are. Please email me for a copy if you would like to consider our full argument and supporting evidence. In the meantime, an article that I consider a must read for anyone who follows politics in Rwanda in particular, the GLR more broadly is Filip Reyntjens latest. You can find it here.