Rhetoric and the politics of genocide

It has again been a very intense few weeks in Rwandan politics. I have been on the road for various speaking and research engagements and have had little time to reflect on all that is going on, and what has been published.

One piece that I wanted to recommend is Geoffrey York's piece in Canada's Globe and Mail. He writes about the political manipulation of Rwanda's blood soaked history. His article is exceptionally well done as it strikes to the politics of manipulation of the history of the genocide and the ideology of genocide that characterises RPF rule at the moment. It is also critically important because York responds to the government's claim that democracy leads to genocide. Presidential advisor Jean-Paul Kimonyo is the mouthpiece for this line of thinking and is what I want to respond to in this post. Kimonyo writes in The Huffington Post in a fashion that is typical of the PR machine of the current regime.

A few points of context and analysis bear comment:

First, Kimonyo's assertion that the 1994 genocide is in part a product of "long-term economic, social and political bankruptcy" is nothing more than political rhetoric designed to justify and legitimise the oppressive rule of the RPF. Analysts and observers who understand that the genocide is not the starting point (either forward to current forms of repression or backward to explaining events in 1959) to understand contemporary Rwanda. The mechanisms of power of the RPF are virtually identical to the forms of power that pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial government's have used to control the Rwandan political landscape. There is little "new" about the new Rwanda (meaning Rwanda under RPF rule).

Kimonyo situates the backward policies of the previous regime to imply that these unequal policies had a role in precipitating the genocide. I don't think this is an accurate depiction of the root causes of the genocide. The RPF government itself lacks the rural legitimacy (which makes up almost 90% of the population) that the Habyarimana government enjoyed. That rural legitimacy meant that when the order to commit acts of genocide came down from the highest levels of the Hutu Power state in 1994, it found resonance in the hearts and minds of ordinary Hutu. They understood that this was a kill or be killed situation Many chose to kill, some because of hatred, others because of fear, some for score-settling... Kagame does not enjoy this rural legitimacy, and that means he cannot accurately predict that Rwandans will voluntarily consent to policies. This explains in part his great nervousness about the presence of opposition politician Victoire Ingabire in the country. Kagame needs to eliminate her as a political opponent lest rural and urban ordinary Rwandan vote for her as a vote against Kagame himself.

Second, Kimonyo writes that the RPF has allowed for consensus democracy. This is misleading to the average reader because the RPF has not allowed for any form of plural politics. Instead, Rwandan 'democracy' operates at the behest of President Kagame, and is subject to his personal whims. True political power exists in the hands of a few elite politicians who are loyal to Kagame. He rules with an iron-fist and is allergic to criticism. Political allies and opponents alike, journalist and human rights activists who question or challenge Kagame's rhetoric are dealt with harshly. The most recent example is Godwin Agaba. See also York's article on Didas Gasana and the stresses and strains of independent reporting in contemporary Rwanda.

We also need to hear more about the possible arrests of senior military officers, including General Karenzi Karake, General Nzaramba and Col. Zigira. Kagame is systemically removing any possible, real or perceived, threat to his authoritarian rule. Political opponents continue to be harassed and intimidated. The most recent example is the case of Deogratias Mushayidi who was brought into policy custody on 5 March. As far as I know, he is being detained without charge. This is not, as Kimonyo asserts, the basis for a consensual democracy.

When the RPF government can possibly eliminate political opponents from within its own military and harangue opposition politicians, this sends a message to the population that fear and insecurity is the order of the day. This has been reinforced with recent bombings in Kigali. The available evidence points to the RPF as the organisers of these attacks. Such incidences of insecurity feed into the rhetoric of senior RPF officials and President Kagame himself that the country is not ready for democracy.

Indeed, it may not be. But not because of Rwandans are not ready to engage pluralist politics (evidenced, according to Kimonyo, in mass political violence and genocide when the country seeks democracy) but because elites (whether Hutu or Tutsi) manipulate the local population to engage in violence as the sole option as power politics (and elite claims to political power) shape their everyday lives.